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1. Executive Summary 
The purpose of this Master’s thesis is to perform a fundamental analysis of Canopy Growth 
Corporation (TSX: WEED), analyse the Canadian cannabis industry and provide a valuation 
of the company as at the 31.03.2018, and ultimately offer an investment recommendation for 
a hypothetically well-diversified investor.  
The Canadian government has announced that it will be opening the recreational marijuana 
industry by the summer of 2018. The prospect of legalization has cause a gold rush towards 
the industry, leading to high levels of investment and market consolidation. Licensed 
producers have been racing to increase capacity to both compete in the market and become 
least cost producers. Canopy has followed the trend, conducting M&A transaction and 
building several new production facilities that will ensure they are the largest producer. The 
company presented strong growth in the medical market however the upside prospects of the 
recreational market far out weigh those of their current operations. The analysis also 
included I a study the cannabis market in the state of Colorado as a proxy for determining 
growth patterns following legalization of cannabis. A central component to the market 
analysis was determining the overall market size, which still remains ambiguous as most 
data comes from self-reported, and biased sources. Furthermore, I found that IFRS 
accounting standards lead to miss representation of financial statements and pose problems 
to identifying value for the uninitiated.  
The valuation of the company was primarily based on two DCF models, one Enterprise Cash 
Flow model and the other a Adjusted Present Value analysis. Based on a potential 20% 
market share assumption and an estimated price per gram of $7. The company can be valued 
at approximately $6B CAD, I have identified a target price of $32.64. This ultimately leads 
us to offer an investment thesis recommendation of Hold or cautious Buy for a well-







The completion of my academic work at NHH would not have been possible without the 
guidance and support of my friends and family. I would like to take a moment to thank my 
thesis supervisor Prof. Carsten Bienz as well as my colleague and dear friend Sebastiano 
Pescarolo, who I had, somewhat unfruitfully, attempted to write several other academic 
works with.  
1.2 Author’s note: 
This Master’s thesis does not present any stance on the moral and legal implications of the 
sale, and or consumption of Cannabis as it remains prohibited in many parts of the world.  
Any or all indications of the contrary do not reflect the views or policies of the Norwegian 
School of Economics, and or my supervisor. The goal of this academic work was to present 
an objective valuation of a publicly listed company in a novel and poorly documented 












This paper represents the culmination of my academic career. With it, I hope to provide a 
comprehensive work that leverages all aspects of my education to date. In my Master’s 
program at NHH I have specialized in finance, and I believe that the best way for me to 
synthesize what I have learnt over these past years is to conduct an in-depth fundamental 
valuation of a public corporation.  
The reason why I have chosen Canopy Growth Company, as the topic of my thesis is simple. 
Being both a Canadian and someone that is extremely interested by niche markets, the 
medical marijuana industry presented a unique opportunity to explore an under studied 
industry and the impact of legalization on valuations in capital markets. An important home 
country bias and Canopy being the largest player in the market made the choice quite simple. 
This being said, there are many factors that must be addressed relating to this academic 
work. Due to the developing nature of the legal framework surrounding cannabis producers 
in Canada, some of the points presented in this paper may have evolved by the time you are 
reading this. For this reason I will be basing my research on all public information available 
as of March 31st, 2018. 
 
Montreal, Canada 









2.1 Company Profile: 
Canopy Growth Corporation, “Canopy” or the “Company”, formerly named Tweed 
Marijuana Inc., is one of Canada and the world’s leading producers of medical cannabis. The 
Company was the first licenced producer in Canada to go public in 2014 and is currently 
traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange (“TSX”), listed under the symbol WEED.  Since its 
creation, Canopy has grown from a producer of simple medical marijuana into a vertically 
integrated company with operations ranging from growing of cannabis plants, to the 
transformation and processing of the plants into various consumer goods. The Company 
currently only sells medical marijuana products as the recreational consumption for weed is 
still prohibited in Canada, as the new Canadian Cannabis Act has yet to come into force 
(expected date of July 1st, 2018).  As at the 28th of March 2018, the company had a market 
capitalization of $6.8B CAD and a price per share of $33.66 CAD. 
Fig1: Canopy stock price between April 1st, 2014 and March 28th, 2018 
 
Source: Capital IQ 
In the past year, Canopy’s share price has increased by more than 300% in the wake of the 
end of cannabis prohibition.  
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Fig2 : Operating Subsidiaries 




Tweed 100.0% Consolidated 
Tweed Farms 100.0% Consolidated 
Bedrocan 100.0% Consolidated 
Spectrum Cannabis 100.0% Consolidated 
Tweed Grasslands 100.0% Consolidated 
Mettrum Hempworks 100.0% Consolidated 
Group H.E.M.P. 75.0% Consolidated 
Spektrum Cannabis 100.0% Consolidated 
Vert Cannabis 100.0% Consolidated 
Bodystream 100.0% Consolidated 
"Apollo" 100.0% Consolidated 
Spot Therapeutics 100.0% Consolidated 
Spectrum Chile 85.0% Consolidated 
Tweed JA 49.0% Consolidated 
Canopy Rivers 34.1% Consolidated 
Spectrum Cannabis Denmark 62.0% Consolidated 
Vert Mirabel 66.7% Consolidated 
BC Tweed 66.7% Jointly operated 
Source: Canopy Q3, 2018 Financial Statements 
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Canopy currently has 18 distinct subsidiaries or affiliated business ventures, mainly 
concentrated in Canada. Currently, the bulk of Canopy’s production is retained for the 
Canadian market, as the export of cannabis and its derivatives remains extremely difficult. 
However, the Company has been able to establish agreements to export medicinal products 
to Australia, Germany and Brazil, and several of their subsidiaries are also located abroad 
(Canopy Growth Corporation, a 2018).  
Canopy Growth Corporation aims to become the leading cannabis company in the world and 
is relatively agnostic in which form the Company will sell it. Canopy’s core brand remains 
Tweed, which offers dry, easy to consume and soft-gel products. The Company is looking to 
expand Tweed into a lifestyle brand through aggressive marketing and an innovative social 
media presence. Canopy has also developed a premium brand, Black Label, as well as other 
brands whose product lines will remain focused solely on medical markets. 
Canopy has grown its production both organically, with growing facility expansions, and 
through acquisitions in the last four years. In fact, since it’s listing on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange, Canopy has acquired 17 other firms for a total value of $514M CAD1. The 
company currently operates 7 facilities totalling 728,000 square feet and currently have 8 
development projects, slated to come into operations by 2019, that would add another 








                                                
1 Capital IQ data retrieved April 21st 
2Macroeconomic analysis report on Cannabis. 
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Fig3: Canopy Growth Operating Facilities  
Facility Type 
Approximate 




Smith Falls, ON Indoor 450,000 
168,000 sq ft licensed + 







168,000 sq ft licensed + 
Development Project Underway 
CY 2018 
British 
Columbia, site 1 
Hybrid 
Greenhouse 
1,300,000 Development Project Underway CY 2018 
British 
Columbia, site 2 
Hybrid 
Greenhouse 




700,000 Development Project Underway CY 2018 
Newfoundland Indoor 150,000 Potential Sites Being Evaluated CY 2019 
Edmonton, AB Indoor 100,000 Development Project Underway CY 2019 
New Brunswick Indoor 50,000 Development Project Underway CY 2018 




Indoor 75,000 Licensed 
 
Creemore, ON Indoor 15,000 Licensed 
 










 Source: Canopy Q3, 2018 Financial Statements 
In February 2018, Canopy announced that it successfully completed an over-subscribed 
treasury share offering on the Toronto stock exchange, raising $250M CAD. The proceeds of 
this stock offering will be primarily be used to fund financing growth projects over the next 
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18 months, according to Jordan Sinclair, the Company’s communications director.  
Canopy’s current strategy is to focus both on domestic and international expansion through 
acquisitions and development of production sites. The funds raised are central to Canopy’s 
continued operations, as the Company remains highly unprofitable to this day. 
2.2 Cannabis Industry: 
Firstly, one must define the industry in which Canopy Growth Corporation falls into. 
Considering Canada is the first G20 nation to be legalizing recreational marijuana use on a 
national scale, the industry finds itself at a crossroads, and essentially in uncharted territory. 
For this reason, the majority of this analysis shall be based on the assumption that marijuana 
producers will naturally diversify their operations and expand to the recreational market. As 
such, the cannabis industry can be composed of two distinct segments: Medical and 
Recreational, both part of a single overarching industry. Secondly, defining what kind 
traditional market cannabis producers most resemble can be difficult, as they present 
characteristics of several current industry sectors.  
At their inception, marijuana producers, also know as “Licenced Producers” or “Growers”, 
have been categorized as “Pharmaceutical” companies, given their end product is in fact a 
form of medication and is controlled similarly to a restricted substance. This classification is 
mostly used by the financial industry. However, these businesses do not operate as normal 
pharmaceutical producers and resemble much more agricultural firms with high levels of 
perishable inventories and large, physical infrastructure. As such, marijuana producers have 
different reporting standards under IFRS that have cause much confusion in the market 
(Owram 2018) than a pharmaceutical company and cannot be valued as such. In essence, 
marijuana producers in Canada are the creators of a new market segment with the distinct 
characteristic of several industries, which is why cannabis should be considered its own 
specific industry.  
The strict production standards and regulatory environment closely mirror the 
pharmaceutical industry. Their operations can only be classified as being an agricultural 
commodity business as dry bulk cannabis is grown, harvested and processes like any other 
crop business would be.  Where licenced producers differ from agricultural firms is in the 
processing of their crops. In essence, dried cannabis is a commodity crop with low costs of 
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production and a relatively low value. This is why producers have branched out into the 
production of value added products and the design of new derivatives of the cannabis plant. 
The extraction of the chemical compounds tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) and cannabidiol 
(CBD) have allowed companies to infuse food, cosmetics, supplements and a wide array of 
other value added products with the desired cannabinoid properties. Producers have 
recognized this reality and have diversified their operations to take full advantage of these 
opportunities. They have, over the past several years, gone through an acquisition spree and 
made forays into the consumer goods segment. While these products are currently 
considered controlled substances and are only sold to patients holding a medical 
prescription, they will be available to the general population and the adult consumer market 
following the opening of the broader Canadian market. This explains why vertically 
integrated marijuana producers should be categorized as their own industry within the 
consumer staple sector, similarly to tobacco, food or alcohol companies.  
Understanding how these firms operate is crucial to determining the companies overall 
operating risks and their idiosyncratic risk with regards to financial market. This analysis 
will be touched upon during financial modeling as it is key to determining the company and 
industry’s over all beta.  
The Canadian Government has determined that the operations of cannabis producers warrant 
their own industry classification and that this new cannabis industry should be included in 
the country’s national accounts. The cannabis industry will now feature in the Canadian 
System of Macroeconomic Accounts and contribute to the country’s Gross Domestic 
Product. (Statistics Canada 2018). 
2.3 Historical perspective of the Medical Marijuana 
segment: 
The use of cannabis, varietals of hemp containing psychoactive ingredients such as THC and 
CBD, has been outlawed in Canada since the 1920’s following the creation of the Narcotics 
Drug Act Amendment Bill. This specific piece of legislation prohibited the used of most 
major drugs such as marijuana, cocaine, opium, heroine, etc (Rough 2017).  
During the tail end of the 1960’s, the Canadian federal government commissioned the Dain 
Commission to study the effects of Non-Medical drug use. The commission’s findings 
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pointed towards the possible benefits of decriminalization of cannabis; however no 
legislative actions were undertaken. In 2000, a court ruling from the Ontario court of appeals 
overturned a previous decision and rendered the prohibition of cannabis unconstitutional, as 
it constituted a form of medical treatment for the respondent, and in such limiting the drug’s 
access infringed upon the claimant’s constitutional rights to healthcare. In 2001, the 
Canadian Government enacted the Marijuana for Medical Access Regulation, which in short 
granted medical patients access to grow their own medical marijuana or to purchase it from 
licenced growers. And so, a new industry was born. 
Since then, medical use of cannabis has also grown throughout the European Union, Israel, 
Australia and a majority of US States. The industry has grown to a thriving industry (Canopy 
a 2018).  
In the 2013, the Canadian government allowed private enterprises to participate in the 
production of cannabis for medical purposes leading the way to the founding of companies 
such as Canopy, Aurora and the other major players in the newly formed industry. 
As of the end of the calendar year 2017, the number of Canadians using medical marijuana 
may represent less than 1% of adult Canadians, however the industry has seen strong growth 
according to research conducted by the Canadian government. In December 2017, there were 
269,502 registered consumers, compared to 174,503 at the start of the year, an increase of 
54%. The Associated Press (2012) reported that Health Canada estimated the market will 









Fig4: Number of Registered Medical Cannabis Consumers  
 
Source: Data compiled from Health Canada reports.  
By volume, sales of medical dried cannabis increased 614%, growing from 2,772kg to 
19,780kg between 2014-2015 and 2016-2017. Furthermore, Health Canada reports 2017-
2018 is also poised to outpace previous years as medical marijuana sales for the first 9 
months were 18,143kg. The volume of cannabis oil has seen an even more astounding 
growth going from 584kg in 2015-2016 to 13,702kg in 2016-2017, with sales for the first 9 
months of the present reporting year passing volumes of dried cannabis at 23,137 kg. At an 
average price of $7.6 per gram of dried weed and weed equivalents, that put the value of the 
Canadian market around $400M CAD for 2017-2018 Health Canada’s estimates the total 







Fig 5: Medical Canabis Sales by Volume  
 
Source: Data compiled from Health Canada 
2.4 Legalization of Cannabis and Capital markets: 
The Liberal government of Canada, in 2016, announced its plan to legalize marijuana for 
recreational use. This legislation has been in the works for the last 2 years, and if all goes to 
plan, the consumption, production and transformation of cannabis for recreational purposes 
will be legal in Canada by July 1st 2018, just in time for the 151st Canadian national day. This 
deadline may be rather optimistic given the current progress the aforementioned regulation 
in the Canadian Senate.   
The proposed new law, The Cannabis Act, would change the status of plants of the Cannabis 
genus from controlled substances under the Canadian Controlled Substances Act (CDSA) 
and would permit the sale, possession and consumption of pot, and marijuana derived 
products by people over the age of 18. The current medical marijuana regulation would 
remain unchanged (Government of Canada 2017). 
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2.5 Sale of Recreational Cannabis  
The sale of dry cannabis buds, oils, and various other derivatives and infused products will 
be permitted to all Canadians over the age of 18, or 19 depending on the province of sale, 
similarly to alcohol. The organization of the sales infrastructure and regulation will be 
attributed to the different provinces and territories of Canada. This, in theory, means the 
Canadian market is opened to roughly 28 million consumers scattered from one ocean to 
another.  Asserting that the market for cannabis is composed of the entire adult population is 
rather misleading. A survey conducted by the Canadian Government (c 2018) found that 
roughly 12% of the population consumes cannabis for recreational purposes already. This 
statistic however, should present several issues, including the fact that it was based on self-
identification surveys, which inherently include high levels of bias. The legalization of these 
products should lead this number to increase significantly but one should not include the 
entire population in this estimate.  
Through provisional provincial legislation, we now know that most Canadian provinces will 
be regulating the sale of cannabis through government run enterprises, most of which are 
linked to their provincial liquor boards. These provincial crown corporations will be 
responsible for purchasing cannabis products from the Licenced Producers and will then 
distribute it throughout their respective jurisdictions. Both Quebec and Ontario, Canada’s 
most populous provinces have limited the sale of cannabis through their government run 
stores and capped the number of initial stores to ensure orderly roll out of the new products. 
In Alberta and BC, however, the provincial boards will allow the sale of cannabis in private 
stores but will still retain their role of distributor to these stores according to the CBC 
(2018).  
What this indicates is that currently, the most important growth factor for Licensed 
Producers is their ability to win purchasing agreements with provincial regulators. This 
implies two things, the first of which is that high levels of compliance with regulators are in 
everyone’s best interests. And two, being a least cost supplier is crucial to growth strategies, 
as most governmental contracts are attributed according to strict rules, which fundamentally 
ends up being tied to price. This being said, each province will be allocated and controlling 
their purchasing separately will make it even harder to estimate sales growth for any given 
player within the market. It is also possible that provinces will support LPs with local 
production facilities, which would help to support local economies. This can favour larger 
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producers who have the resources to build greenhouses across the country. Furthermore, all 
sales by licensed producers are going to be on a wholesale basis, which translates to 
significantly lower margins for the Licensed Producers than if they had the option to have 
their own retail locations. 
Fig 6: Provincial Cannabis Regulation Breakdown  








Alberta  4,300,000  18 no limit Yes Yes Yes 
British 
Columbia 




Saskatchewan  1,200,000  18 
    








40 and 150 by 
2020 
Yes No Yes 
Quebec  8,400,000  18 
15 and 150 by 
2020 
Yes No Yes 
New Brunswick  760,000  19 20 Yes No Yes 
Nova Scotia  954,000  19 
 
Yes No Yes 
Prince Eduard 
Island 
 152,000  19 
 
Yes No Yes 






Yukon  39,000  19 1 Yes Yes Yes 
Northwest 
Territories 
 45,000  19 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Nunavut 38,000  
Expected to 
be prohibited 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
(Data from: Associated Press & BNN) 
 19 
The Province of Quebec has come out as one of the first provinces with a real purchasing 
strategy. They will be allocating nearly 62,000kg of Cannabis to 6 different LPs.  The 
stipulations of these agreements have not all been made public however, recurring 
information seems to indicate that the LPs have agreed to base purchase quantities and fixed 
durations of possibly 3 years (Rendell 2018).  This can give us a base indication as to the 
possible initial size of the Canadian Cannabis market as the province of Quebec does 
represent nearly a quarter (22,87%) of the Canadian population.  This would put the total 
volume of the Canadian market around 271,000kg. Industry analysts (Shenfeld 2016 p.7), 
however estimate the market to be somewhere in the rage of 770,000 kg.  
It is important to note that all products will have to be sold in generic packaging, similarly to 
tobacco products, to dissuade young consumer and minors from smoking.  However, this 
regulation will be less stringent than it is for the tobacco industry. This will have an 
important impact on how firms differentiate themselves from the rest of the industry (see 
competitive landscape section). With regards to dry bulk cannabis, as previously mentioned, 
is a commodity product, meaning firms will need to either invest in R&D to develop specific 
new varietals with different properties, or will need to become least-cost to win over the 
recreational consumers.  In fact Ouellet, Macdonald, Bouchard, Morselli & Frank (2017) 
found that cannabis consumers displayed price sensitivity. Their results demonstrated that 
the Canadian market has price elasticity of demand between -0.42 and -0.60, meaning that a 
10% variation in price would lead to an inverse movement of demand between 4% and 6%. 
When considering this and the fact that marketing initiatives are will be limited due to Bill 
C-45, on cannabis packaging, the risk of substitution is quite high.  
The Canadian Government conducted a comprehensive study in 2017, and estimated the 
total value of the cannabis industry in Canada to be worth roughly $5.7B CAD.  Others place 
the value of the market between $4.9B and $8.7B (depending on average price per gram) and 
that the economic windfall considering all ancillary industries linked to cannabis production 
(infrastructure construction, testing labs, security services) would be in the range of $12B to 
$22B CAD (Deloitte 2017). To put things into perspective, these estimates place the 
cannabis industry on par with the Canadian spirits market. A gold mine of sorts for both 
government revenues and market potential.   
Another proxy for estimating the direction of the Canadian market could be to analyse the 
recreational market in US states that have legalized cannabis. In the Public Safety Canada 
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report “Price of Cannabis in Canada”, the authors (Ouellet, Macdonald, Bouchard, Morselli 
& Frank 2017) base themselves heavily on data collected by US governmental agencies to 
establish market trends and characteristics that could be applicable to the Canadian market. 
Therefore a relevant example could be Colorado, the first state to fully legalize recreational 
cannabis in 2014. Despite having a population of approximately 5.6M people, (Government 
of Canada d 2017) it represents one of the only sample market that has collected enough 
information on the industry to present actual trends. Data compiled by the Department of 
Revenue of Colorado shows that the recreation sales presented a 53% annual compounded 
growth rate between 2014 and 2017 (Government of Colorado 2017). Furthermore, their data 
indicated that medical sales had started to stabilize and even decrease throughout the 
observed period. This is indicative that perhaps, medical users switched to legal cannabis 
due to its higher availability and the increased variety of products in the market.   
Fig 7: Marijuana Sales in Colorado 
 
Source: Colorado Department of Revenue 
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2.6 Market Dynamics: 
The cannabis industry today has two distinct types of licenced producers within the market. 
The first model being the large licensed producer. LPs will be vying for the main share of the 
market, producing a wide range of products in high volumes with the goal of being least cost 
producers. Their product being a commodity, their growth depends on the growth of sales as 
a whole and the reduction of their operating costs. These producers face risks linked to steep 
competition and price volatility, as well as contract attribution by the provincial governments 
who will buy the products.  
The second model is that of the niche or specialized producer. These are LPs that cannot 
compete on scale but look to differentiate themselves through specialized products, which 
would garner high sales prices. These niche producers, face many risks through competition 
and also face the risk of being acquired by their larger competitors.  
Canopy falls under the Large LP category. Their main competitors within the market are 
Aurora Cannabis Inc. (TSX: ACB), Aphria Inc. (TSX:APH), MedReleaf Corp. 
(TSX:LEAF), CannTrust Holdings Inc. (TSX:TRST), Organigram Holdings Inc. 
(TSX:OGI), The Hydropathecary Corporation (TSX:THCX), and Cronos Group Inc. (TSX: 
CRON). 
The prospect of full legalization has sent an incredible influx of investment into the market. 
Cannabis producers have seen considerable growth in market value over the past year, with 
an average increase in share price of 211.8% among the largest producers. Once a novel 
investment vehicle, weed stocks, as they are colloquially known, have gained investor 




                                                
2Macroeconomic analysis report on Cannabis. 
ttps://www.baystreet.ca/articles/research_reports/fundamental_research/Canadian-Marijuana-Industry-Overview-Final.pdf 
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Fig 8: Stock returns of the top 5 listed Licenced Producers, by market capitalization, between 
March 30th, 2017 and March 29th, 2018: 
Source: CapitalIQ – compiled by Author 
2.7 Market consolidation:  
These large players have also adopted the strategy to grow through acquisitions. In fact, 
Canopy’s largest competitor, Aurora, has conducted 7 acquisitions since its original listing 
on the TSX (a reverse take-over of Prescient Mining Corp in 2014) totalling $1.49B CAD. 
The most notable of which was the take-over of CanniMed Therapeutics, Inc. valued at 
$1.11B CAD, the largest acquisition in the market to date, according to CISION Newswire 
(2018).  This shows that even some of the largest LPs are not safe from take-over bids. 
Aurora is positioning itself to be the largest producer in the market. This not only allowed 
them to acquire an established customer base of medical cannabis clients but also to increase 
their production capacity.  
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3. Methodology 
There exist several ways many ways to evaluate the value of a publicly traded company. 
These techniques theoretically take into account all publicly available information to 
determine a fair value for an enterprise currently traded on a stock exchange. Financial 
theory identifies two major approaches to stock valuation: fundamental valuations and 
relative valuations.  
3.1 Absolute Value approach: 
Absolute or intrinsic value approaches take into account the firm’s distinct financial 
performance and characteristics such as dividend rates, growth, cash flows, retained 
earnings, etc. Through this approach one can use several other models to arrive at a valuation 
estimate for the shares of the company. The most common techniques include the dividend 
discount model (DDM), discounted cash flow model (DCF) and asset based valuations.  
3.1.1 Dividend Discount Model 
Dividend Discount Models quite simply discounts the future dividends paid out by the firm 
to determine its fundamental value to an investor. The accuracy of this model is predicated 
on the analyst’s ability to predict future dividend policies for the firm and the appropriate 
discount rate to use. DDMs are rather unreliable as not every company pays out dividends 
nor can future dividend policies be forecasted. This model should not be utilised given the 
current exercise.  
In the case of Canopy and marijuana producers, DDMs would prove highly ineffective 
seeing as they are companies focused on growth. Firms in that stage of the lifecycle, such as 
Canopy and its peers, are highly unprofitable, as well most of them are still raising capital to 
fund their on going operations. Koller, Goedhart and Wessels (2015)3, indicate as well that 
Dividend policies are also a signalling mechanism to investors that management no longer 
                                                
3 Koller, Goedhart and Wessels, “Valuation, Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies”University Edition”, 
Mickensey & Company, USA, page 98. 
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believes in its ability to conduct value-creating projects. DDMs should therefore not be used 
with regards to valuing a growth stock such as Canopy.     
3.1.2 Discounted Cash Flow Model 
The DCF looks to calculate the present value of future cash flows. The reasoning behind this 
being that a firm’s value is the Net Present Value (NPV) of its future cash flows. This 
methodology allows for detailed modeling of cash flows, which represent the key value 
driver when determining the value of a firm. There are however some limitations to these 
absolute valuation models. A company’s current lifecycle stage may not lend itself to a 
discounted cash flow method. For example, early stage, pre-revenue companies or even 
distressed firms will not necessarily report positive financial results, which when applied 
within a DCF return negative valuations, and which is categorically incorrect. DCFs 
represent the most concrete and accurate representation of a firm going forward as you are 
able to model out cash flows, and set clear and precise estimates and assumptions. This 
would be the ideal method used to determine absolute value for a firm. The granularity that 
this method provides may, however, also lead to significant risk of human error linked to 
assumption selections.  
There exist several types of DCF models, which will use different performance 
measurements as well as different discount factors. Koller, Goedhart and Wessels (2015), 
outline the various in the most common models used by academics and industry 









Fig 9: Framework for DCF-Based Valuations 




Works best for projects, 
business units, and 
companies that manage 
their capital structure to 
a target level 
Discounted Economic 
Profit 
Economic profit WACC 
Explicitly highlights 
when a company creates 
value 
Adjusted Present Value 
(APV) 
FCF Unlevered cost of equity 
Highlights changing 
capital structure more 
easily than WACC-
based models 
Capital Cash Flow Capital cash flow Unlevered cost of equity 
Compresses free cash 
flows and the interest tax 
shield into one number, 
making it difficult to 
compare operating 
performance across 
companies and over time 
Equity cash flow Cash flow to equity Levered cost of equity 
Difficult to implement 
correctly because capital 
structure is embedded 
within the cash flow. 
Used when valuing 
financial institutions. 
Legend: WACC = Weighted Average Cost of Capital, FCF = Free Cash Flows, Economic 
profit = Invested Capital x (Return on Invested Capital – WACC) 
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3.1.3 Frameworks of DCF Valuation: 
To be concise and not regurgitate previous academic reference materials, I have chosen 
to compare the implications of WACC and APV methods and forgo Capital cash flow 
and equity cash flow models as they do not fit the realities of the present exercise.  
3.1.4 Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC – methods) 
One of the main methods used in a DCF model is to use a Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
method to discount future cash flows to the present date. (ie Enterprise Discounted Cash 
Flow or Discounted Economic Profit models). The WACC discount factor does require 
certain assumptions to hold for the model to function correctly.   
Firstly, the model assumes cash flows are perpetuities, an often-unrealistic prediction. 
Secondly, it assumes a fixed corporate tax rate and lastly it follows the assumption that the 
firm maintains a constant leverage ratio. As firms progress through their life cycles, their 
capital structures are destined to change as well.  
In the case of Canopy, the company is currently in a growth phase and are part of an industry 
that is still developing. The industry being in its infancy and seing as legalization has yet to 
come there is not clear that there is an optimal capital structure or debt to equity ratios for the 
industry. Using a static model with a constant leverage ratio therefore poses a problem.  
3.1.5 Adjusted Present Value (APV – Method) 
The Adjusted present value approach utilizes the same free cash flow approach as an 
enterprise DCF; however, the Firm can be valued in two sections, the Enterprise Value of the 
unlevered as well as the Present Value of Tax shields generated from financial leverage. 
APV = Vu + PVTS 
This method utilises a different discount factor for each section. The EV for an all equity-
financed firm is calculated as the NPV of free cash flows discounted by the cost of unlevered 
cost of equity (Ku) and a discount factor relative to the present value of the interest tax 
shield (Ktx).  This method as outline above in the table better suits valuing companies with 
changing capital structures.  
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In the case of Canopy, it is clear that the company’s capital structure will change in the 
short-run. At the moment the company has little to no debt and continues to raise equity 
through share offerings. A public debt offering is surely in the cards for Canopy. This is why 
an APV valuation would make sense for the company. It is important to note however that 
modeling a news debt levels would be a nothing more than a guessing game.  
3.2 Relative Value approach: 
The second approach is a comparative evaluation of the stocks value based on key metrics 
called a multiple-valuation. By following this approach one must look at key ratios and 
performance multiples of comparable firms or of the industry as a whole to determine the 
fair value of the stock.  
A significant risk linked to comparative valuations is the peer selection criteria. One must 
identify firms with similar risk, growth and cash flows. This being said, relative valuations 
can be useful in certain situations such as for early stage firms, as they might have negative 
operating income.  This method is used in Private Equity and Venture Capital markets where 
you don’t have share prices.  Comparative valuations also use far fewer assumptions than a 
DCF, which ultimately in a certain way limits the risk of including faulty or biased 
parameters within the financial model.  
In public markets, analysts principally use the price-to-earnings (“P/E”) multiple as their key 
ratio, however this may be an over simplification of the model for our purposes. This 
methodology does not include many of the subtle intricacies required for a fundamental 
valuation of a company in the context of making an investment decision and establishing a 
share price. A more realistic approach would be to use Net Enterprise Value (“NEV”) 
divided by Earnings before interest taxes, depreciation and amortization (“EBITDA”) or by 






3.3 Model Selection: 
The choice between fundamental or relative valuation is a no brainer. Although multiple-
valuations could be effective for the early stages of an industry, the immaturity of the newly 
minted Cannabis industry and lack of consensus in the market relative to cannabis 
producers’ valuations and capital structures allows us to determine it would be impossible to 
establish an accurate peer group with consistent ratios necessary for using a relative 
valuation. Furthermore, multiple based valuations do not offer the granularity required for 
the nature of this paper. At this stage in the industry’s life cycle a relative valuation would be 
similar to a scatter shotgun and the DCF would be an accurate riffle.  
Question remains, which DCF to use. The enterprise cash flow methods, which uses FCFs 
discounted by the firm’s WACC, or the Adjusted Present Value model, which uses the cost 
of unlevered equity as a discount factor. Canopy will be evaluated using both methods and 
the results will then be compared.   
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4. Canopy Growth Corporation Company Analysis 
4.1 Competitive environment: 
Canopy Growth Corporation was one of the first licenced producers to enter the medical 
marijuana market in 2014. Since then they have grown extremely quickly. At the moment 
there are approximately 100 Licensed Producers in Canada.  
4.2 SWOT Analysis: 
4.2.1 Strengths: 
• Canopy’s greatest strength remains its size. Canopy currently has the largest 
production footprint amongst its peer group, allowing them to achieve significant 
economies of scale and allows them to be one of the least cost producers in the space. 
This is paramount in a commodity product environment.  
• The second strength of Canopy is their positioning as a vertically integrated 
company, with operations from genetic diversification all the way to the production 
of cannabis derived consumer staples. This allows them to control the entire 
production chain and to offer higher margin, value added products.   
• Canopy also was one of the best-established brands in the cannabis space. Tweed, its 
former namesake has positioned itself as one of the most recognisable brands in the 
cannabis market. Tweed has been trying to transcend the pharmaceutical market to 
establish itself as a lifestyle brand as well. 
• On October 30th, 2017, Canopy entered into a strategic partnership with Constellation 
Brands (NYSE:STZ) a producer and marketer of alcoholic beverages. In return for a 
9.9% equity stake at the time (valued at $245M  CAD), Constellation Brands would 
provide analytical support, branding expertise and strategic help with the consumer 
beverage markets. Furthermore, Canopy has also been able to foster important 
relationships with public figures such as the rapper Snoop Dogg, through his business 
Merry Jane, a cannabis lifestyle company and information network. These initiatives 
drive Canopy’s brand image, which can hopefully increase consumer engagement 
and build fidelity. 
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• Canopy has been able to establish itself across the country with several production 
facilities. This facilitates transportation, increases capacity and facilitates distribution 
but also gains favour with provincial government who are responsible for the 
wholesale purchasing of recreational cannabis for their regions.  
• Canopy has established a very responsible financial position. During its rapid growth 
period, the company has been able to access capital extremely easily by raising 
equity. This has allowed them to limit their leverage, and reduce their financial risk. 
• Canopy has developed a strong R&D portfolio, which has the capacity to develop 
new strands of cannabis to fit the diverse needs of its clients. 
 
4.2.2 Weaknesses: 
• Canopy has grown extremely quickly thanks to large scale funding rounds. In total 
Canopy has issued nearly $1B CAD in equity. This has lead to rapid growth, and low 
financial risk, however this has also lead to the significant dilution of original 
shareholders within the firm.  
• The firm seems to rely heavily on stock based compensation to attract and 
compensate their top management. In fact, stock based compensation represents 
nearly 50% of total revenue (first 9 months, ending December 31, 2017). Even 
though this does not represent actual cash based expenditures, it does present a clear 
signal to the market that Management is perhaps over compensated or too focused on 
paying themselves out versus ensuring the success of the firm.  
 
4.2.3 Opportunities: 
• Canopy is well positioned in the market to continue to grow through organic sales but 
also through acquisitions. Smaller producers will have a harder time competing at 
scale with Canopy, making them easy targets for corporate takeovers. This is coupled 
with low interest rates in the Canada, which means that there is both an abundance of 
cheap capital and opportunities for consolidation. Furthermore, Canopy’s aversion to 
debt and strong cash reserves will facilitate potential acquisitions in the future.  
• Its position and recognition worldwide means that should new markets open to the 
recreational cannabis sector, and that Canopy’s expertise should give it a clear 
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advantage in the international market. Furthermore, the Company is already 
operating through subsidiaries in Europe and Australia.  
4.2.4 Threats: 
• Canopy’s largest competitor continues to grow organically but most importantly 
through acquisitions. The current M&A environment means there is an inherent risk 
of take-overs in the market. A consolidation also translates to higher price 
competition within the market as producers look to bring down production expenses 
through scale. 
• Uncertainty surrounding the official regulation in Canada and the official legalization 
still casts doubts over the market. The start date for selling recreational cannabis, 
initially July 1st, 2018 seems to be rather optimistic at the moment.  
• International regulation ambiguity, such as in the US, lead to more difficult financing 
through debt and American banks, and limits the overall shareholder pool as 
institutional investors shy away from the sector. Furthermore, difficult regulatory 
environment in the USA make it impossible for Canadian LPs to enter in the US 
market due to strict securities laws. These however preclude licensing of intellectual 
property. 
• The relatively low barriers to entry in the market, and large upside potential mean 
that more and more players will look to enter the cannabis market, which will 
ultimately lead to increased supply and a lower market price of their final product.  
• Low product differentiation steaming from plain product packaging regulations 
means that consumers will be highly influenced by price.  
4.3 Purchase orders 
To date, Canopy has reached several agreements with provincial regulators for the wholesale 
of cannabis products. As mentioned in the market dynamics section these provincial sales 
represent the future revenue streams for Licenced Producers in the recreational market. As of 
the 31st of March 2018, Canopy had received four letters of Intent or Memorandums of 
Understanding (MoU) from provincial cannabis associations (Canopy a 2017).  
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Though the purchase price for these agreements has yet to be disclosed, we do know the 
volumes that Canopy will be supplying.  The province of Quebec has stated its intent for 
purchase 12,000kg, and up to 25,000kg per year over a period of 3 years. The province of 
Newfoundland and Labrador will look to purchase a minimum of 8,000kg per year. The 
province of Prince Edward Island (PEI) issued an MoU for 1,000kg, and New Brunswick 
has issued an MoU of 4,000kg. 
Fig 10: Provincial Purchase Orders 




Length of contract 
(Years) 




PEI 1000 2 
Quebec* 12000 3 
Total 25000 
 
 Source: Canopy Q3 Financials and Capital IQ 
These agreements represent the foundation for our modeling of recreational cannabis 
operations revenue going forward. However, there still remain questions as to the status of 
Canopy’s sales in the remaining Canadian provinces and territories. At an average price of 
roughly $6.5/gram, these 4 provinces alone would represent yearly sales of $162.5M CAD, 
more than four times its current medical sales for the financial year 2017 and roughly three 
times its sales for the first 9 months of FY2018. This demonstrates the exponential growth 
that Canopy and its competitors are expected to experience over the next few years.  
The central difficulty remains in estimating their sales in the other Canadian provinces as 
there are really no way to assign sales volumes to contracts that have not been attributed. 
This being said, as the largest licensed producer in Canada, Canopy’s ability to secure 
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agreements is rather probable.  This is thanks to their long-standing cooperation with 
regulators and their broad network of growing facilities across the country.  
4.4 Financial Summary 
Canopy’s sales have increased exponentially since it started its operations in 2014, going 
from $1.9M in 2015 to $39.9M in 2017. The company’s year-to-date Q3 2018 results show 
that they were able to grow sales by 130.6% compared FY 2017 results. This increase is 
indicative of the strong growth within the medical marijuana sector, as these figures have yet 
to include any sales of recreational products. 
Fig 11: Financial Highlights 
Key Financials (Millions of CAD)       
For the Fiscal Period Ending FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 Q3 2018 
Total Revenue  1.9   12.7   39.9   55.1  
  Growth Over Prior Year NA  569.5%   214.2%   130.6%  
Gross Profit  2.3   19.0   38.7   67.0  
  Margin %  119.2%   149.5%   97.0%   121.5%  
EBITDA  (6.1)    0.9   (0.7)    (13.6)   
  Margin % NM  7.3%   (1.7%)   (24.7%)  
EBIT  (6.6)    (1.3)    (6.7)    (28.8)   
  Margin % NM  (10.4%)   (16.8%)   (52.2%)  
Net Income  (7.5)    (3.5)    (7.5)    (8.8)   
  Margin % NM  (27.5%)   (18.9%)   (16.0%)  
 Source: Canopy Q3 Financials and Capital IQ 
 34 
An interesting observation is that the company’s gross margin figures are nearly 99.6%. This 
is solely due to IFRS reporting standards.  Seeing as their products are technically 
agricultural produce, accounting rules oblige companies to account for changes in fair value 
of biological assets4 when computing their gross margin. By capitalizing fair value changes 
in biological assets and inventory, companies are essentially counting their chickens before 
they hatch. These changes fluctuations in fair value are linked to increased production and 
inventory size, which will eventually be smoothed out when cannabis companies reach 
stable production levels. However for now, these line items have the effect of seriously 
overstating the financial performance of the firm in question. This problem is in fact 
endemic to the industry, and will require further adjustments when modeling revenues. (See 
financial adjustments). 
Furthermore, Canopy is currently unprofitable; with the company presenting a negative Net 
Income figure since its inception. Losses in 2018 are particularly high due to several factors, 
but most notably from stock-based compensation to employees, which amounted to nearly 
$34.3M, or, more than 50% of sales during the LTM ending Q3 2018. This was due to 
Canopy using stock based incentives linked to acquisition milestones. This compensation 
structure allows them to ensure that management’s interests are aligned with Canopy’s long-
term goals. This being said, they do represent a concerning portion of their total 
expenditures. However, stock based compensation is not a cash expense and will therefore 
need to be adjusted for when assessing the company’s intrinsic value. (see financial 
adjustments). 
4.4.1 Balance Sheet: 
The company has grown its balance sheet significantly over the last year; its numerous 
acquisitions and investments have led them to increase their assets 7.4x since March 31st, 
2016, reaching $1,091M.  A large portion of it consists in new facilities with Property, Plant 
and Equipment having grown to $108M from just 46M in 2016. The largest portion of the 
increased assets is attributable to goodwill, which represents 24.9% of the company’s total 
assets.  The increase in goodwill is attributable to Canopy’s strong M&A activity and their 
preference for acquiring targets with strong brands. 
                                                
4Castaldo, J. (2018) “Canadian Weed Stocks have a serious Accounting problem” MAcleans Magazine, retrieved from:  
https://www.macleans.ca/economy/canadian-weed-stocks-have-a-serious-accounting-problem/ (March 25th 2018) 
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 Fig 12: Presentation of Canopy’s Assets 
Balance Sheet         






ASSETS     
Cash And Equivalents  21.4   15.4   101.8   237.7  
Total Receivables  0.8   1.5   5.8   9.1  
Inventory  6.4   27.5   60.7   108.3  
Prepaid Exp.  0.8   0.5   3.7   5.6  
Other Current Assets  0.0  -  6.7   13.5  
Total Current Assets  29.4   44.8   178.8   374.2  
     
Net Property, Plant & 
Equipment 
 18.1   44.3   96.3   154.0  
Long-term Investments - -  24.0   141.6  
Goodwill -  20.9   241.4   272.3  
Other Intangibles  0.3   32.6   162.3   127.9  
Other Long-Term Assets -  0.8  -  25.1  
Total Assets  47.8   143.4   702.7   1,095.1  
 Source: Canopy Q3 Financials and Capital IQ 
The Company was able to fund its growth thanks to multiple equity offerings, which has 
limited their need for financial leverage. This has translated into the firm having total 




Fig 13: Presentation of Canopy’s Liabilities 







LIABILITIES     
Accounts Payable  4.1   5.9   15.1   24.6  
Accrued Exp.  0.2   0.3   0.3   0.5  
Curr. Port. of LT Debt  0.2   0.6   1.7   1.5  
Unearned Revenue, Current -  0.5   0.6   0.7  
Other Current Liabilities - - -  1.9  
Total Current Liabilities  4.5   7.2   17.7   29.2  
     Long-Term Debt  1.7   3.5   8.6   7.3  
Def. Tax Liability, Non-Curr. -  7.4   35.9   38.8  
Other Non-Current Liabilities  0.2   1.5   0.8  - 
Total Liabilities  6.4   19.6   63.0   75.3  
Source: Canopy Q3 Financials and Capital IQ 
The overall capital structure of Canopy minimizes any chance of financial risk. In fact, the 
firm has a coverage ratio of 10x.  This places Canopy in a strong position to optimize its 
capital structure down the line and take on debt when financial institutions fully embrace the 
cannabis industry.  
4.5 Key performance Indicators 
4.5.1 Average Price per gram: 
Ouellet, Macdonald, Bouchard, Morselli & Frank (2017) outlined in “the Price of Cannabis” 
that the main price determinants for marijuana were quality, transaction volume and 
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proximity to harvest sites.5 The average price per gram sold by Canopy reached $8.30/gram 
in Q3 FY 2018, a 12% increase from the average price for the same period in FY 2017. The 
average price per gram includes the price of cannabis derivative products, ie oils, and gel 
capsules. The sale of oils accounted for 23% of the company’s total revenue, up from 14% 
during the same period of the 2016 financial year. Oils and capsules were the main driving 
factors in the increased average price per gram due to their higher margins. Canopy assumes 
a conversion ratio of 8ml of oil per gram of dry cannabis. Going forward however, purchase 
prices will be negotiated by the provinces and will likely fall throughout the industry. This 
will be due to the fact that LPs will be selling at wholesale prices to the government 
agencies; which is why companies will need to ensure they can produce at a lower cost then 
their competitors. 
4.5.2 Cash Cost of Production per gram: 
The main performance indicator that differentiates large producers has to be the cash cost of 
production of a gram of cannabis. The major players in the market all seem to report a 
version of this non-standard, non-IFRS metric slightly differently. However, it remains the 
best way to evaluate their production efficiency. They have chosen to report the cash 
expenses linked to the product and adjust for any non-cash provisions that are normally 
required under IFRS reporting.  
Canopy reported in their Q3 2017 financial statements that they had reached a level of 
$1.03/gram cost before shipping and fulfillment. This is compared to $1.41/gram for 
Auroraduring the same period and Aphria presented the lowest cost per gram at $0.95/gram 
for the period ending August 31st, 2017 (their last period reporting this figure) according to 
data compiled by Cornerstone Investments (2018).  Canopy finds itself in the middle ground 
when compared to its largest competitors.  
Over the last year, Canopy has been able to decrease its cash cost of production by roughly 
26.9%. The savings were attributable to both their pre and post-harvest expenses. Increased 
utilization of their facilities, improved plant yields and more efficient oil extraction all were 
the main contributing factors to the company’s cost savings. These production costs are 
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likely to continue to fall as Canopy’s newer facilities come online and they can generate 
larger economies of scale. 
Fig 14: Cash Cost Per Gram of Cannabis 
  Q3 2017 Q4 2017 Q1 2018 Q2 2018 Q3 2018 
Cost per gram to harvest 0.87 0.86 0.76 0.72 0.59 
Post harvest cost per gram 0.54 0.6 0.51 0.53 0.44 
Cost per gram before 
fulfilment  1.41 1.46 1.27 1.25 1.03 
Cost per gram for shipping and 
fulfilment 1.17 1.44 1.5 1.48 1.5 
Weighted average cost per 
gram 2.58 2.9 2.77 2.73 2.53 
Source: Canopy Q3 Financial Report   
Canopy has however seen its weighted average cost per gram remain relatively constant over 
the same period due to increased investments into their packaging and marketing, which they 
accounted for in the cost per gram for shipping and fulfilment. Canopy’s focus on 
developing a certain brand image through their packaging has ultimately driven up 
production costs and affects their bottom line. These costs are likely to remain constant 
going forward as Canopy’s strategy is very brand centric.  
4.6 Adjustments to financial statements 
As mentioned previously, the cannabis industry presents many intricacies that must be 
addressed to properly evaluate the financial performance of a firm. Due to reporting 
standards, the young nature of the industry and a lack of research on the topic, weed stocks’ 




4.6.1 Non-Cash Expenses – Fair Value measures of Biological Assets 
Firstly, one must address the issue of miss representative gross margins. In the previous 
section, it became apparent that publicly listed companies such as Canopy, were obligated to 
report gross margins exceeding 100%. A value that is both beyond the scope of logic and 
reason. Under IFRS reporting rules, set out by the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) and which Canada has adopted, the IAS 41 rule outlines how one should report 
revenue and expenses related to agricultural operations. Rule IAS 41 (see Annex) indicates 
that if the company believes that their biological asset will likely be sold then they can 
capitalize the said asset as revenue prior to the being being harvested. I the case of Canopy, 
agricultural assets include plants that have yet to be harvested, seeds, and mature plants both 
harvested and not. 
The standard indicates that these assets should included at their fair value, less their cost of 
harvest, as an unrealized gain on variations in biological assets, as outlined in Canopy’s 
income statement. These changes in fair value can be quite substantial as demonstrated in the 
table below. These unrealized gains are due to 2 distinct factors, firstly the increased growth 
of the biological assets from period to period, and the second is the overall change in the 
number of biological assets. Therefore considering Canopy’s major increase in site 
utilization, ie the number of plants grown increased in its current facilities, plus the increase 
in production area available, ie the number of production sites, and finally the increase in the 
overall market price for its biological assets have all lead to Canopy reporting unrealized 
gain on changes in fair value of biological assets significantly higher than its actual revenue 
for the given period.  As these gains are in fact defined as unrealized, therefore not actually 








Fig 15: Revenue breakdown & Biological Assets  
Income Statement 




















Currency CAD CAD CAD CAD 
  
    
Revenue  2,371   12,699   39,895   55,142  
Total Revenue  2,371   12,699   39,895   55,142  
Revenue Growth % 
 
436% 214% 38% 
     Cost Of Goods Sold 2400  19,722   22,747   23,501  
Gross Profit  (29.00)  (7,023)  17,148   31,641  
Margin % 
 
-55% 43% 57% 
     Fair value changes in biological assets 
included in inventory sold and other inventory 
charges  
5721  12,796   39,577   46,339  
Unrealized gain on changes in fair value of 
biological assets 
-8576  (38,805)  (61,143)  (81,713) 
Gross Margin after fair value impact  2,826   12,060   38,714   67,015  
Margin % 119% 95% 97% 122% 
Source: Canopy financial statements 2015-2018 Q3 
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When adjusting for these unrealized gains we can observe that gross profit margin are in fact 
more realistic and only include direct cash flows to the firm.  
4.6.2 Operating Expenses – Employee Stock Options  
The second adjustment to be addressed in the income statement for modeling purposes is 
relating to operating expenses. The company has attributed significant amounts of employee 
stock options (ESOPs) as part of managers’ compensation packages and as incentives to 
reaching acquisition performance targets. In Q3 2018, the total ESOP payout represented a 
non-cash expense to the firm of 28M CAD, or 52% of sale. This can represent a serious red 
flag for investors as having such important levels of compensation related to M&A activity 
could lead managers to pay more attention to their milestones and ultimately disregard the 
long term profitability of the firm. 
Fig 16: Employee Stock Option expenses 
Source: financial statemets 2015-2018 Q3 
 
 








Last 9 Months Dec-
31-2017 
Currency CAD CAD CAD 




Share Based comp linked to acquisition milestones  -     690   11,228  
Growth %     1527% 
Total  3,497   8,736   28,936  
Percentage of sales % 28% 22% 52% 
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4.6.3 Adjustments to Net Working Capital 
As defined by Ross, Westerfiel, Jordan and Roberts in “The Fundamentals of Corporate 
finance”, Net Working Capital (NWC), is the difference between current assets and current 
liabilities of a company. This is a measure of financial performance for the firm as it allows 
us to observe the company’s financial health and future prospect. A positive NWC indicates 
the company’s ability to pay short term liabilities with its current assets. When conducting a 
DCF, we find Free Cash flows by subtracting Changes in NWC and expenditures from 
NOPLAT.  
The delta NWC indicate cash outflows linked to increases in short-term assets such as 
inventory or marketable securities, etc. However it also includes Cash and cash equivalents, 
this poses a problem for Canopy has from year to year, the company has raised substantial 
amounts of capital, which have partly remained in cash. These cash reserved are earmarked 
for M&A activity down the line and will ultimately be used to pay for capital expenditures 
as well. So the changes in Cash reverses will likely skew delta NWC rather significantly 
which poses a problem for financial modelling. I have decided because of this to consider 
NWC as a proportion of sales going forward and not include cash inflows resulting from 
changes in capital structure IE stock sales, or debt financing.  
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5. Forecasting 
I will be preparing and presenting several valuation models and comparing them to 
determine which presents the best method for valuing a weed stock. AS mentioned in the 
methodology section, the APV and Enterprise Cash flow models will be the central focus for 
the analysis however, a brief relative value analysis has also been prepared to have a diverse 
comparison.  
Regardless of which time of DCF used one must first calculate the Free Cash Flows. In the 
following section, I will run through the major components that make up the FCF and 
outline my model’s assumptions based on the company’s financial reports, external sources 
and academic material.  
To arrive at free cash flows, you must identify the Company’s Net Operating Profits Less 
Taxes (NOPLAT), which is compose of Gross Profits, less operating expenses and Cash 
taxes adjusted for non-cash expenses. From the NOPLAT, we then obtain FCFs by 
subtracting capital expenditures and changes to net working capital. 
5.1 Revenue – Recreational market 
To determine the overall revenue for the firm going forward we require 2 key figures: 
number of grams or gram equivalents sold and the average revenue per gram generated.  
To find the number of grams sold, one would have to know which provinces have committed 
to purchase products from Canopy as well as estimate the future growth of medical 
marijuana sales. For the moment, Canopy has only reached understanding with the 
government of Quebec, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island (PEI) and Newfoundland. 
These MoUs and LOIs will form the basis of the revenue forecast.  
As mentioned previously, Quebec’s LOIs can help us estimate a total market size for 
recreation marijuana. Considering that the province of Quebec represents approximately 
22% of the population and it has committed itself to purchasing a minimum of 62,000kg of 
cannabis products, we can estimate that the Canadian recreational market would be in the 
area of 271,000 kg of cannabis. Like this we can allocate sales in the market proportionately 
based on population size.  
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Fig 17: Sales forecasting by Region  
Recreational Market Estimates 
   Population  Population % 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
Quebec  8,400,000  22.88%  62,000   93,000   139,500   195,300   253,890  
New Brunswick  760,000  2.07%  5,629   8,443   12,664   17,730   23,049  
Prince Eduard Island  152,000  0.41%  1,126   1,689   2,533   3,546   4,610  
Newfoundland  529,000  1.44%  8,000   9,333   10,889   12,341   13,575  
ROC  26,876,000  73.20%  194,252   291,378   437,067   611,894   795,462  
Canada total  36,717,000  100%  271,006   403,843   602,653   840,811   1,090,586  
Growth rate 
   
50% 50% 40% 30% 
 Source: data compiled from Statistics Canada, &  Canopy press releases 
I estimated that the recreational market would grow by 50% in its first two years, and then 
by 40% and 30% the subsequent years. In Colorado, the cannabis industry grew 90% in its 
second year of operations, and by 50% and 30% the following years. Considering the market 
participants in Colorado were mainly small private enterprises, and not large crown 
corporations, these small, nimble dispensaries that could increase purchase orders rapidly 
and fill the growing demand. In the case of Canada, provincial entities will not have the 
same flexibility to increase their purchases as well as their neighbours to the south. 
Furthermore, there is a risk that Canadian licensed producers are not able to meet the overall 
demand in the market due to lag in the production capacity availability. This is why I have 
limited the market growth to 50% in the first two years of legalization.  
Newfoundland, however presents a problem to this methodology. It seems that the youngest 
Canadian province that accounts for only 1.44% of the population has committed itself to 
purchase, from Canopy, 8000 kg of marijuana for its recreational market, or almost 3% of 
the total market. The province is clearly punching over its weight class with regard to its 
recreational cannabis purchases, for this reason I have decided to throttle its projected 
growth to a third of the rest of the country (ie. Xt = X(t-1) * (1+(g(t)/3)) ). This being said, 
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Canopy should hold almost the entirety of the market, as it is the sole producer to be 
building a growing facility in Newfoundland. Considering shipping and fulfillment already 
represent 50% of the weighted average cost per gram as per Canopy’s Q3 2018 financial 
results. Canopy should therefore be the cheapest supplier of the province.  
Canopy’s sales were then split into 5 categories, Quebec, New Brunswick, PEI, 
Newfoundland, and the Rest of Canada (“ROC”). The four provinces with purchase orders 
set base sales, and for the ROC we assume that Canopy, being one of the largest producers, 
and having the most widespread production sites, could secure between 15% and 25% of the 
remaining market.  For simplicity, I assume they will capture 20% market share. Canopy is 
well positioned to win contract thanks to its production network but also because of its focus 
on governmental compliance and cooperative research. Following the duration of the 4 
purchase agreements, we assume that Canopy’s sales will be the higher value between a 20% 
proportion of the market’s cannabis sales, and the size of their previous years sales plus 20% 
of the market’s growth. Quebec is assumed to reach its 25,000kg by the end of the contract.  
Fig 18: Key Scenario Presentation 
20% FY 2019F FY 2020F FY 2021F FY 2022F FY 2023F 
Quebec  12,000   18,500   25,000   44,680.12   58,084.16  
New 
Brunswick  4,000   4,000   4,000   5,013.15   6,076.97  
Prince Eduard 
Island  1,000  1000  1,168.86   1,371.49   1,584.25  
Newfoundland  8,000  8000  8,311.11   8,601.48   8,848.30  
ROC  38,850.41   58,275.62   87,413.43   122,378.80   159,092.44  





5.2 Revenue – Medical Market  
Regarding medical marijuana revenue, I modeled 2019 – 2021 with the same growth 
parameters as the medical market in Colorado, in other words 13%, 7% and -7% growth 
respectively. This is the main reference available on how the market will react to a 
recreational alternative. I assert that sales should continue growing but that ultimately patient 
registration will stall as people seeking treatment will be able to self medicate thanks to a 
market with fewer barriers to purchases. Following the decline in the third year, I assume 
growth would be at constant at roughly 3% per annum.  
5.3  Revenue – Consolidated  
One of the central factors to estimating future cash flows generated by Canopy is to setting a 
price per gram metric. Now we know that over time, the cannabis market will be flooded 
with new entrants who have been attracted by the industry’s impressive potential. This and 
the added production capacity in the market will drive down the price per gram of cannabis. 
As of the 31st of December 2017, Canopy was selling their products at an average price per 
gram of $8.3 CAD.  That is, however, before it will be selling its products wholesale, which 
will be at a significant discount to the sheer volumes that Canopy will be supplying. 
Statistics Canada found that in February of 2018, the average price per gram of pot was 
$6.83 CAD, with the average price for a single gram being $8.36 CAD per gram. I have 
supplied the assumption that the average price per gram will be starting at $7 and will 
decrease by 5% per year over 5 years Similarly to the price outlined by Statistics Canada (b 
2018). The decrease in price will be to reflect both price competition caused by new entrants 
in the market and pressure from provincial buyers. This represents a 15% discount on the 
current price per gram. Large-volume purchase-orders are essential to Canopy’s operations, 
as they help allow reduce the overall risk of the company.  It allows Canopy to determine its 

























Currency CAD CAD CAD CAD CAD CAD CAD CAD CAD 
Price per 
Gram - - - - 7.00 6.65 6.32 6.00 5.70 
Rec. Sales 
(kg) - - - - 63,850 89,776 125,893 182,045 233,686 
Rec. Sales 
($) - - - - 446,953 597,008 795,332 1,092,566 1,332,372 
Med. Sales 
($) 12,699 39,895 55,142 68,928 75,820 81,128 75,449 77,712 80,044 
Total 




214% 38% 73% 658% 30% 28% 34% 21% 
 
Given a rapidly growing recreational market, a constant market share of 20%, steady growth 
rates in the medical sector and an initial, declining, price per gram of 7$, Canopy should 
achieve total revenue in excess of $1B CAD by the end of FY 2022.  
5.4 Cost of Goods Sold 
5.4.1 COGS – Recreational  
Considering we know the current weighted average cost per gram (“WACGs”) in Q3 
FY2018 was $2.53/gram. The cost of production and harvesting amounted for roughly a 
$1/gram where as the costs associated with the shipping and fulfilment amounted to 
$1.5/gram. As Canopy continues to expand its production capacity and their new facilities 
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come online it is reasonable to assume that Canopy will be able to diminish its overall cost 
per gram thanks to operation efficiencies, economies of scale on packaging and shipping 
costs, it is fair to assume that they will be able to reduce their WACGs by at least 5% per 
year. COGS are based on the product of WACGs and the volume of recreational sales. The 
change 5% annual operating efficiency is very reasonable considering that Canopy has been 
able to reduce its cost per gram pre fulfilment by 27% between Q3 2017 and Q3 2018. 
5.4.2 COGS – Medical  
Regarding the costs associated to the Company’s medical marijuana sales, we assume that 
Canopy will be able to reduce its expenses through operating efficiencies, consolidated 
purchasing, and economies of scale. We assume that COGS of medical cannabis will shrink 
by 5% a year assuming an initial medical cannabis gross margin of 40%.   
















2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 





 -     -     -     -    2.40 2.28 2.17 2.06 1.96 
Recreation 
Sales (kg) 
 -     -     -     -     63,850   89,776   125,893   182,045   233,686  
COGS 
(Rec) 
 -     -     -     -     153,464   204,987   273,083   375,140   457,479  
COGS 
(Med) 
 19,722   39,577   23,501   29,639   30,328   29,287   25,875   25,319   24,774  
Cost Of 
Goods Sold 
 19,722   39,577  
 
23,501 
 29,639   183,793   234,274   298,958   400,459   482,254  
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Source: Capital IQ, Canopy Financials and compiled by the author 
We of course do not include any non-cash expenses as mentioned previously in the section 
regarding non-cash adjustments.  
5.5 Operating Expenses 
5.5.1 Sales & Marketing Expenses 
This account represents all of Canopy’s expenditures related to brand initiatives, sales forces, 
as well as outreach initiatives for the medical market. Considering that most of these costs 
have already been ramped up in anticipation of legalization, it is hard to tell how to model 
this expense going forward. Forecasting Sales and Marketing using a historical average 
percentage of sales would lead to ridiculously high expenditure as well. I used the 
assumption that Sales & Marketing expenses will double as from their 2018 levels and 
would then be a calculated as a proportion of total sales (11%). At this level it makes much 
more sense to consider it a constant ratio of sales. Furthermore, marking expenses are 
generally closely linked to sales so it represents a good fit.  
5.5.2 R&D Expenses: 
The historical average R&D expenditure represented amounted to 2% of sales. Going 
forward R&D expenses will be set to 1% of sales, this represents a 400% jump, over the FY 
2018 expenditures. Canopy is currently developing novel IP regarding plant genetics and 
growing patterns.  
5.5.3 General & Administrative Expenses: 
Canopy states that they are presenting higher than usual G&A expenses due to the regulatory 
framework surrounding the legalization of pot. In fact, they state that these expenses are 
linked not only to internal expenses but also to compensate operations consultants, 
compliance advisors as well as normal operating expenditures linked to Canopy’s facilities. 
Yet again this indicates that most of the cost linked to the recreational market has already 
been included. That being said, G&A expenses also include overhead linked to production 
sites. Considering Canopy will be expanding its total production capacity 9 fold, a 
substantial increase in expenditures would be advisable. We assume that G&A expenses will 
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grow by 300% and represent 19% of sales going forward. This will be caused by the new 
facilities coming online and because over all G&A expenses at they’re previous levels were 
not sustainable.  
5.5.4 Acquisition expenses: 
Lastly we have acquisition expenses. Given the particular situation that Canopy find’s itself 
in, the Company’s M&A expenses should in fact be included in operating expenses as 
acquisitions are common place both in the industry and on a company level.  Buyouts are the 
most effective way to add production capacity in the short run. As there is an all out race 
between the largest producers to acquire the most capacity, it is reasonable to assume that 
Canopy’s related expenses will increase over the observed periods.  
















2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 
Currency CAD CAD CAD CAD CAD CAD CAD CAD CAD 
Sales & 
Marketing  5,653   12,960   23,452   29,315   58,630   76,054   97,660   131,249   158,405  
% of Sales 45% 32% 43% 43% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 
R & D Exp.  721   810   914   1,143   4,657   6,042   7,758   10,426   12,583  
% of Sales 6% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
General 
Admin.  8,177   16,858   26,936   33,670   67,340   87,353   112,168   150,747   181,937  
% of Sales 64% 42% 49% 49% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 
Acquisition 
related costs  1,155   7,369   2,491   2,491   3,672   4,763   6,116   8,219   4,960  
% of Sales 9% 18% 5% 4% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0.4% 
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Source: Capital IQ, Canopy Financials and compiled by the author 
5.6 NOPLAT 
Lastly, to obtain our NOPLAT values, you must calculate the cash taxes from operating 
revenue. Canopy currently has a marginal corporate tax rate of 26.5%.  
















2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 
Currency CAD CAD CAD CAD CAD CAD CAD CAD CAD 
Taxes  (6,023)  (9,985)  (5,871)  (7,243)  16,196   59,883   77,390   104,358   127,546  
Corporate 
Tax rate 







 (16,707)  (27,695)  (16,282)  (20,088)  154,815   166,091   214,647   289,446   353,761  
Margin % -132% -69% -30% -29% 30% 24% 25% 25% 25% 
Source: Capital IQ, Canopy Financials and compiled by the author 
 
Total Op. 
Exp.  15,707   37,998   53,794   66,619   134,299   174,211   223,701   300,641   357,886  
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5.7 Free Cash Flows: 
Now that we have established NOPLAT we can calculate the free cash flows by subtracting 
Capital Expenditures and changes in Net Working Capital from the tax adjusted operating 
profits.  
5.7.1 Delta Net working Capital: 
As outline in the pervious section, we have adjusted net working capital on a cash free basis 
because the cash on hand artificially inflated NWC values and that the cash reserves were in 
fact earmarked for acquisition purposes. The main determinant in NWC is therefore 
inventory. Historically Canopy has had NWC far superior to their sales due to holding large 
inventories. This can be attributable to the fact that the Company would have had to keep 
large amounts of product on hand as the medical market is much more fragmented and that 
individual sales are quite small, making it harder to plan and organize production. With the 
arrival of sales of recreational pot, Canopy should be able to hold less inventory by 
comparison as they can better organize their production, thanks to large regular purchase 
orders.  The change in NWC was therefore deemed to increase by one fourth of the 
company’s sales’ growth factor for the first year. This is due to the fact that the expected life 
cycle of cannabis plants is roughly 90 days, meaning you can have 4 harvests a year 
according to Bergman (2018)6. The higher the harvest frequency, the more easily you can 
justify having a lower relative inventory levels. Thanks to their new builds Canopy will have 
enough capacity and space to be able to stager production runs to ensure continuous 
harvesting throughout the year. Following FY 2019, NWC is set to grow at the same growth 
rate as sales.  
5.7.2 Capital Expenditures 
 The second part of the equation is the capital expenditures. Similarly to NWC, CapEx is 
difficult to model for Canopy, as there does not seem to be any historical patterns. We do 
know however that they still have facilities under construction most of which should be 
completed within the next year, accord to the Q3 2018 MD&A report. We can therefore 
assume a spike in CapEx in 2019, followed by a lull in investments and finally in year 2021 
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to 2023 we assume a constant level of CapEx, which is lower than levels prior to the 
legalization as Canopy should be more focused on optimization of their production than 
adding too much capacity. The increase will be used to complete the existing projects.  
We can observe that given our assumptions, Canopy presents strong FCF following an initial 
loss in FY 2019.  
Fig 23: Free Cash Flow Breakdown 








FY 2018F FY 2019F FY 2020F FY 2021F FY 2022F FY 2023F 






(NOPLAT) (16,707) (27,695) (16,282) (20,088) 154,815 166,091 214,647 289,446 353,761 
Margin % -132% -69% -30% -29% 30% 24% 25% 25% 25% 
Less - Capital 
Expenditures 
         Delta PPE 26,149 51,989 57,712 57,712 
     Plus 
Amortization 1,900 4,700 7,300 7,300 





         NWC 37,653 161,121 345,011 345,011 
     Less Cash and 
Equivalents 15,397 101,800 237,708 237,708 
     Adjusted 




NWC 18,851 37,065 47,982 47,982 96,154 60,465 74,975 116,561 94,237 
Free Cash 
Flow (FCF) (63,607) (121,449) (129,276) (133,082) (41,339) 105,626 89,672 122,885 209,524 




6. DCF Valuation 
6.1 Discount Rate 
When conducting a DCF we use the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to help calculate 
the appropriate discount factor for the firm’s cash flows. The CAPM gives us the cost of 
equity for a given stock, which can then be used in several permutations when conducting a 
stock valuation. For example, APV models will utilize an unlevered cost of capital to 
discount free cash flows, where as an enterprise cash flow model will use the WACC to set 
the discount factor.  
The CAPM states that the expected rate of return of a security is the result of : 
 
To use the CAPM on must first find the stock’s Beta value. The Beta represents the 
covariance of returns between a stock and the given benchmark market index divided by the 
overall variance of the market. The beta allows us to determine the market risk linked to a 
stock, i.e. if the market were to present+ 1% returns, the beta would indicate the amplitude 
of the effect this would have on the stock.  
 
The selection of the market benchmark is quite important, as the reference point cannot help 
us calculate expected returns afterwards. I conducted several studies to identify which 
benchmark to use. Damodaran (2018) suggests using monthly returns data over a period 
between 2 and 5 years, as monthly returns provide less noise than daily returns for example 
and that period of time should produce enough data to analyse and is recent enough to 
accurately represent the company’s current activities. That being said 2 years of monthly 
data represents a very small sample of observations. He also asserts that one should use large 
diverse indexes as benchmarks to more accurately replicated the “Market” index, which 
would theoretically encompass every possible investment opportunity.  
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I conducted several test on benchmark indexes and time periods and found that both the 
MSCI World index and the NASDAQ were poor reference points to use. Regressing 
Canopy’s returns with either one of the indexes’ presented both extremely low Beta values 
as well as also low R squared results. Given the stock’s volatility, using those beta outputs 
would be a mistake, as they would clearly misrepresent Canopy’s expected returns. 
Furthermore, the low R squared value indicates that the beta shows low levels of correlation 
with the market returns. (see Annex 2) 
The optimal index tested was the TSX Composite Index as it yielded results more in line 
with financial references such as CapitalIQ, (3.1) MarketWatch (0.8), YahooFiance (3.59), 
etc. This is inline with Damodaran’s (2018) assertion that when calculating Betas in practice, 
the theoretical “Market Portfolio” is in fact the investor’s “home country” stock exchange.  
The TSX Composite Index yielded a 2-year daily returns Beta of 1.33. The index will also 
serve as the basis for calculating the market risk premium, which put simply, is the 
difference between the benchmarks return and a risk free security, most commonly being a 
long-term US treasury bond, however this should be interchangeable with any sovereign 
debt from a nation with low default risk. The 10-year Canadian Treasury Bond rate was 
2.11% on the 28th of March 2018 and will be the risk free rate. The market return was 
6.49%7.  Using the CAPM formula, the find the expected cost of Capital to be 7.94%.  
To conduct an APV we must calculate the unlevered cost of equity, using an unlevered Beta. 
The Unlevered beta is calculated as follows:  
 
Given Canopy’s current Capital structure the unlevered Beta, , is 1.26. Removing debt 
reduces some financial risks from the equation, hence the unlevered Beta being smaller than 
the levered beta calculated before. The new cost of equity is then 7.64%. There is only a 
slight difference due to the fact that canopy has little debt.  
                                                
7 TSX market data compiled from CapitalIQ – using 9 years of daily returns.  
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To conduct an enterprise cash flow valuation, one must use the weighted average cost of 
capital. As at December 31st, 2018, or the last public earnings disclosure, Canopy had a 
marginal corporate tax rate of 26.5% and debt to equity ratio of 7.75%. To find the WACC 
we also require the company’s cost of debt. Canopy has a very small amount of interest 
bearing debt, as outline above. Their current interest bearing debt is listed as follows: 






Capital Lease   1.1  5.900% - 
17.100% 
Term Loans   3.0  4.800% 
Term Loans   1.3  5.300% 
Term Loans   3.2  4.900% 
Revolving Credit - NA 
Term Loans   1.7  10.000% 
  Source: CapitalIQ 
Assuming that the capital leases bear an interest rate of 11.51% (the mean of the town rates), 
then Canopy’s weighted average cost of debt is approximately 6% and the marginal 
corporate tax rate is 26.5%. Now we can calculate the company’s WACC.  
 
The Company’s WACC is therefore 7.69%. 
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6.2 Enterprise Cash Flow DCF Valuation: 
The model is composed of 5 periods that have been mapped out in the sections above. 
Following the 5th period, I have set the assumption that the firm will have established a 
foothold in the market and it had entered a steady state growth period. We assume growth to 
be 5% going forward. To obtain the company’s equity value we look at it on a we then adjust 
the results found from the DCF for debt and add back cash. 
The enterprise cash flow model arrives at an equity value of $5.84B, or $29.54 per share. I 
conducted a sensitivity analysis to consider the impact varying potential market share and 
the initial price per gram metrics. The analysis showed that in most scenarios, Canopy seems 
to be overvalued. In fact, the model shows that Canopy only present actionable upside for an 
investor if they are capable of securing 25% market share across Canada and sell their pot 
for at least $6.7/gram or at least $7.5/gram if they can only secure 20% of the market.   
Fig 25: Scenario Analysis Enterprise Cash Flow DCF 
Market 
Share / $ 
per Gram 15% 20% 25% 
6.5 $9.31  $20.65  $31.05  
6.7 $11.96  $24.20  $35.25  
7 $15.95  $29.54  $41.57  
7.5 $22.63  $38.47  $52.12  
8 $29.33  $47.43  $62.70  
   Source: Compiled by the Author 
That being said, these parameters are still in the realm of possibility and all in all the 
enterprise cash flow model seems to resemble analyst expectations for price. The company’s 
upside is also significant considering the price per share at March 31st 2018.  
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6.3 APV Method 
Similarly to the Enterprise DCF, the APV method discounts the FCFs back, however, the 
APV uses the unlevered cost of equity to do so and also includes the present value of tax 
shields. This metric allows for us to examine a company with a changing capital structure. 
From a macro point of view, Canopy should fit that criterion. The company continues to 
raise capital to fund its operations and acquisitions. Debt is readily available, yet the 
company has shied away from it. Leveraging the company would allow the management to 
keep a steady cash reserve while preventing any further dilution to the shareholder base.  
To apply valuation methodology, leverage would have to be added to the firm. I assume in 
this case that Canopy would raise $200M CAD in year 1, FY 2019, which they could pay 
down at a future date. Regardless, capital repayment of loans does not fit into the parameters 
of the model, however the corporate tax shield, which the debt created, does. Raising the 
debt may face issues as American financial institutions still face restrictions regarding 
investments relating to the sale of substances deemed to be illicit in the US. Given their 
current cash reserves and projected revenue the debt, does not serve any purpose apart from 
granting a tax shield benefit. In March of 2018, the Canadian Corporate bond yield for long 
term maturities between 6-15 years was approximately 3.25%.  I would be fair to assume 
that Canopy would obtain slightly less favourable terms, as they are still in growth phase and 
cash flow negative, thus inherently more risky then a standard corporate debt issuer. I will 
use an assumption that the cost of debt will be 8% interest, as their current weighted average 
cost debt was approximately 6%, in increased leverage leads to higher default risk and 
should warrant a higher rate.  Lastly let us assume the debt will have a maturity of 10 years. 
Given the same base scenario of 20% market share, and an initial average price per gram 
sold of 7$, and anticipated steady state growth rate of 5%, the Enterprise value of the firm 
reached $6.01B, with Equity amounting to a price per share of $30.29. With a current stock 





Fig 26: Scenario Analysis APV  
Market 
Share / $ per 
Gram 15% 20% 25% 
6.5 $9.62  $21.21  $31.83  
6.7 $12.33  $24.84  $36.13  
7 $16.41  $30.29  $42.58  
7.5 $23.23  $39.42  $53.37  
8 $30.08  $47.43  $64.18  
Source: Compiled by the Author 
Scenario table shows however, that there is significant upside potential for Canopy if they 
are capable of securing a 25% market share in the recreation cannabis market.  
6.4 Analysis 
When comparing the two model’s outputs we find that they produce very similar results 
given base assumptions. That being said, the APV model does take into account the 
company’s current life-cycle stage as well as propose a marginally more optimistic outlook 
for Canopy. The APV method did however present forecasting issues such as determining 
new debt levels, estimating the costs of debt and establishing relevant debt maturity. Despite 
those difficulties I will base my recommended target price on the APV valuation. 
Based on the assumption that Canopy can secure 20% of the total market share, I estimate 
that the price per share of the company should fall within the range of $21.21 CAD and 
$47.43 CAD.  The short-run target price is $32.64 per share (calculated as the average price 
estimate given 20% market share).   
This being said, it is clear that pot producer are still in their infancy which does pose 
problems for the overall nature of the present exercise. Without reliable long-term data, 
assumptions are often based on empirical knowledge or other industries.  
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Furthermore the current exercise posed important problems related to availability of 
information. The truly is a void when it comes to research on the cannabis industry from a 









 Source: Compiled by the Author 
6.5 Recommendation 
Given this price target of $32.64 and the current share price as at March 31st, 2018 of $33.66. 
I would give a Hold recommendation or a cautious Buy recommendation for an average risk 
liking investor. The company presents a large upside potential and strong competitive 
advantages within the market. Canopy is one of the most probable winners in the Cannabis 
industry due to its size, its strong regulatory compliance team and its global expansion 
strategy. 
One should note however that there are risks associated to their operations. Including the 
possibility of not signing new sales agreements with provincial stores, increased 
competition, as well as higher regulatory requirements that would impede upon growth.  
The Canadian Cannabis industry presents substantial opportunities for investors, who should 
not shy away from the hazy results but embrace the future of cannabis as a growing industry.  
Price Target – TSX: WEED 
 62 
7. Bibliography 
• The Associated Press (2013) « $1.3B medical marijuana free market coming to 
Canada », CBC News, retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/1-3b-medical-
marijuana-free-market-coming-to-canada-1.1872652 (accessed on April 1st 2018) 
• Aurora Cannabis Corp. (2017)  “Management Discussions and Analysis of Financial 
Conditions and Results of Operations Q4 2017” retrieve from 
https://investor.auroramj.com/assets/financials/2018/Q2MDA.pdf 
• Bell, A. (2017) “Pot politics: A look at the provinces' legalization plans going into 
2018” BNN, retrieved from: https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/cannabis-legalization-a-
look-at-the-province-s-plans-for-2018-1.954826 (accessed on April 30) 
• Bergman, R. ((2018) “The life Cycle of the Marijuana Plants” – I Love growing 
Marijuana blog. Retrieved from http://www.ilovegrowingmarijuana.com/life-cycle-
marijuana-plants/ (accessed on March 30th 2018) 
• Canopy Growth Corporation, (a 2018) “MANAGEMENT’S DISCUSSION AND 
ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCIAL CONDITION AND RESULTS OF 
OPERATIONS” text: https://www.canopygrowth.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/Canopy-Growth-Corporation_Q3_2018_MDA_FINAL.pdf 
(accessed April 21st) 
• Canopy Growth Corporation, (a 2017) “2017 Consolidated Financial Statements”. 
retrieved from:  https://www.canopygrowth.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/Canopy-Growth-Corporation_Q4_FY_2017_Financial-
Statements-Amended_Final.pdf (accessed April 21st) 
• Canopy Growth Corporation (b 2018) Bought Deal Announcement. Retrieved from: 
https://www.canopygrowth.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/180207_Canopy_Growth_Corporation_Closes_Previously_
Announced_Bought_Deal_Financing_for_200_Million.pdf Accessed: (March 2018) 
 63 
• Castaldo, J. (2018) “Canadian Weed Stocks have a serious Accounting problem” 
MAcleans Magazine, retrieved from: https://www.macleans.ca/economy/canadian-
weed-stocks-have-a-serious-accounting-problem/ (March 25th 2018) 
• CBC (2017) How the provinces are planning for pot legalization. Retrieved from 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/province-pot-marijuana-legal-1.4405084  Accessed 
on: April 17 2018 
• Cision Newsire (2018) “Aurora Cannabis Announces Final Regulatory Approval for 
CanniMed Therapeutics Acquisition”, Retrieved from 
https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/aurora-cannabis-announces-final-regulatory-
approval-for-cannimed-therapeutics-acquisition-675386103.html (accessed on March 
2nd, 2018) 
• CornerStone Invesments (2018) “ Comprehensive guide to cannabis valuations” – 
Seeking Alpha , Retrieved from https://seekingalpha.com/article/4135989-complete-
cannabis-guide-1-production-cost 
• Damodaran, A (2018) “ Estimating Beta” NYU Stern Corporate Finance Packet, 
retrieved from : http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfspr17/session7.pdf. 
Accessed on (May 12 2018) 
• Damodaran A ,”Estimating Risk Parameters” NYU Stern, retrieved from:   
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/pdfiles/papers/beta.pdf  (accessed on : June 2nd 
2018) 
• Government of Canada (a 2018) Market Data Medical Mariujuana retrieved from : 
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-health-products/medical-use-
marijuana/licensed-producers/market-data.html (Accessed on April 10) 
• Government of Canada (b 2017) Legislative Background : Bill C-45. Retriever from :  
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/marijuana/c45/c45.pdf Accessed Feb 2018 
• Government of Canada (c 2017) Canadian Cannabis Survey, Retrieved from: 
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/publications/drugs-health-
products/canadian-cannabis-survey-2017-summary.html Accessed on (April27) 
• Government of Canada (d 2017) Census 2017 , Retrieved from: 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/CO accessed on (March 30) 
 64 
• Government of Colorado (2017) “Colorado Marijuana Sales Report” Retrieved from: 
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/revenue/colorado-marijuana-sales-reports 
(Accessed March 2018) 
• Deloitte ( b 2018) “IFRS Standard IAS 41” –retrieved from 
https://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/ias/ias41 (Accessed on: March 25th 2018) 
• Koller, Goedhart and Wessels, “Valuation, Measuring and Managing the Value of 
Companies”University Edition”, Mickensey & Company, USA, page 98. 
• Owran,K. (2018). “Overly rosy plant valuations can then lead to big writeoffs in an 
industry that's already prone to wild price swings”, Financial Post. Retrieved from 
http://business.financialpost.com/investing/pot-sector-gets-audited-hallucinations-
amid-accounting-quirks 
• Rendell M (2017)” Quebec Inks Deal with Six Marijuana growers”, The Financial 
Post, retrieved from: 
http://business.financialpost.com/commodities/agriculture/quebec-inks-deals-with-
six-marijuana-growers-the-first-large-province-to-line-up-supply-as-legalization-
looms accessed on: April 27, 2018 
• Shenfeld A (2016) "Growing their own Revenue - CIBC World Market economic 
insight” (2016) retrieved from:  
http://research.cibcwm.com/economic_public/download/eijan16.pdf (January 30, 
2018) page 7 
• Statistics Canada (2017) A Cannabis Economic Account  - Framework. Retrieved 
from : https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/13-605-x/2017001/article/54881-
eng.htm accessed on: January 1st, 2018 
• Statistics Canada (b 2018) “Crowdsourcing Cannabis prices” retrieved from: 
https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/180309/dq180309e-eng.htm 
 65 
8. Annex 1: IAS 41 Regulation 
Summary of IAS 41 
Objective 
The objective of IAS 41 is to establish standards of accounting for agricultural activity – the 
management of the biological transformation of biological assets (living plants and animals) 
into agricultural produce (harvested product of the entity's biological assets). 
Scope 
IAS 41 applies to biological assets with the exception of bearer plants, agricultural produce 
at the point of harvest, and government grants related to these biological assets. It does not 
apply to land related to agricultural activity, intangible assets related to agricultural activity, 
government grants related to bearer plants, and bearer plants. However, it does apply to 
produce growing on bearer plants. 
Note: Bearer plants were excluded from the scope of IAS 41 by Agriculture: Bearer Plants 
(Amendments to IAS 16 and IAS 41), which applies to annual periods beginning on or after 
1 January 2016. 
Key definitions 
[IAS 41.5] 
Biological asset A living animal or plant 
Bearer plant* A living plant that: 
is used in the production or supply of agricultural produce is expected to bear produce for 
more than one period, and has a remote likelihood of being sold as agricultural produce, 
except for incidental scrap sales. 
Agricultural produce The harvested product from biological assets 
Costs to sell The incremental costs directly attributable to the disposal of an asset, 
excluding finance costs and income taxes 
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* Definition included by Agriculture: Bearer Plants (Amendments to IAS 16 and IAS 41), 
which applies to annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 2016. 
Initial recognition 
An entity recognises a biological asset or agriculture produce only when the entity controls 
the asset as a result of past events, it is probable that future economic benefits will flow to 
the entity, and the fair value or cost of the asset can be measured reliably. [IAS 41.10] 
Measurement 
Biological assets within the scope of IAS 41 are measured on initial recognition and at 
subsequent reporting dates at fair value less estimated costs to sell, unless fair value cannot 
be reliably measured. [IAS 41.12] 
Agricultural produce is measured at fair value less estimated costs to sell at the point of 
harvest. [IAS 41.13] Because harvested produce is a marketable commodity, there is no 
'measurement reliability' exception for produce. 
The gain on initial recognition of biological assets at fair value less costs to sell, and changes 
in fair value less costs to sell of biological assets during a period, are included in profit or 
loss. [IAS 41.26] 
A gain on initial recognition (e.g. as a result of harvesting) of agricultural produce at fair 
value less costs to sell are included in profit or loss for the period in which it arises. [IAS 
41.28] 
All costs related to biological assets that are measured at fair value are recognised as 
expenses when incurred, other than costs to purchase biological assets. 
IAS 41 presumes that fair value can be reliably measured for most biological assets. 
However, that presumption can be rebutted for a biological asset that, at the time it is 
initially recognised, does not have a quoted market price in an active market and for which 
alternative fair value measurements are determined to be clearly unreliable. In such a case, 
the asset is measured at cost less accumulated depreciation and impairment losses. But the 
entity must still measure all of its other biological assets at fair value less costs to sell. If 
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circumstances change and fair value becomes reliably measurable, a switch to fair value less 
costs to sell is required. [IAS 41.30] 
Guidance on the determination of fair value is available in IFRS 13 Fair Value 
Measurement.  IFRS 13 also requires disclosures about fair value measurements. 
Other issues 
The change in fair value of biological assets is part physical change (growth, etc) and part 
unit price change. Separate disclosure of the two components is encouraged, not required. 
[IAS 41.51] 
Agricultural produce is measured at fair value less costs to sell at harvest, and this 
measurement is considered the cost of the produce at that time (for the purposes of IAS 2 
Inventories or any other applicable standard). [IAS 41.13] 
Agricultural land is accounted for under IAS 16 Property, Plant and Equipment. However, 
biological assets (other than bearer plants) that are physically attached to land are measured 
as biological assets separate from the land.  In some cases, the determination of the fair value 
less costs to sell of the biological asset can be based on the fair value of the combined asset 
(land, improvements and biological assets). [IAS 41.25] 
Intangible assets relating to agricultural activity (for example, milk quotas) are accounted for 
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Currency CAD CAD CAD CAD CAD CAD CAD CAD CAD 
Price per Gram  -     -     -     -     7.00   6.65   6.32   6.00   5.70  
Recreation 




























































































Growth %  214% 38% 73% 
757
% 31% 30% 34% 22% 
          Weigthed 
Avergae Cost 
per gram 
 -     -     -     -    2.40 2.28 2.17 2.06 1.96 
Recreation 
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% of Sales 45% 32% 43% 43% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 











% of Sales 6% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 



































 6,275   8,433   5,131  
% of Sales 9% 18% 5% 4% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 






























































-94% -40% -40% 36% 37% 37% 37% 38% 






























rate 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 





































-69% -30% -29% 32% 27% 27% 27% 28% 
          Less - Capital 
Expenditures 
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